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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
HUMAN SERVICES ex rel. CATHY 
A. PARKER, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
HARRY D. IRIZARRY, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Case No. 930583-CA 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
This case arises out of a paternity action filed by Cathy 
Parker in May 1989 against Harry Irizarry, the unmarried father of 
twin girls born in April 1985. In addition to ongoing child 
support from May 1989 forward, which the trial court ordered 
Irizarry to pay after he acknowledged paternity, Parker sought a 
judgment against Irizarry for child support attributable to the 
four years before she filed the paternity action. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45a-3 (1992). The trial court denied this pre-filing 
child support claim based on equitable estoppel. 
Appellant State of Utah, Department of Human Services asserted 
the following two issues on appeal: 
• Can equitable estoppel apply to bar recovery of child 
support from an unwed, biological father for the four years 
before the paternity action was filed? 
• If so, do the trial court's findings here--that Parker, 
while pregnant, communicated to Irizarry she wanted nothing to 
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do with him--nonetheless fail as a matter of law to show the 
prerequisite elements of estoppel, including reasonable 
reliance by Irizarry on statements or conduct by Parker 
inconsistent with her claim for pre-filing child support in 
the subsequent paternity action? 
This Court issued a decision in the case (Addendum A) on April 
13, 1995, that affirms the trial court's denial of Parker's claim 
for four years of pre-filing child support. Appellant files this 
Petition for Rehearing pursuant to rule 35, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, on two grounds. 
First, it is unclear which of the two opinions, the lead 
opinion by Judge Bench or the concurring opinion by Judge Wilkins, 
is intended to be the decision of a majority of the appellate panel 
members. Second, the concurring opinion seems to conclude that 
(1) current Utah law allows application of estoppel to bar recovery 
of child support for the four years before filing of the paternity 
action, but (2) the biological father in this case could not 
reasonably have relied on the mother's statements or conduct, 
before she gave birth, communicating that she wanted nothing to do 
with him and did not want his support. 
If the second conclusion has been reached by two judges of 
this Court, the result on appeal should be reversal of the trial 
court's ruling on the estoppel issue and remand for entry of a 
judgment against Irizarry for the four pre-filing years of child 
support. Yet, the concurring opinion confusingly purports to agree 
with the result reached by Judge Bench, which is affirmance of the 
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trial court's application of estoppel to deny Parker's pre-filing 
child support claim. 
CERTIFICATION 
Appellant's counsel certifies that this Petition for Rehearing 
is presented in good faith and not for delay. Clarification of 
which views are those of a majority of the Court and clarification 
of the actual majority view about the unreasonableness or 
reasonableness of any reliance by Irizarry on Parker's statements 
is necessary to give clear direction to trial judges who enter 
child support judgments against biological fathers in the thousands 
of paternity cases filed in Utah each year.1 
ARGUMENT 
I. IT IS UNCLEAR WHICH OF THE TWO OPINIONS IS 
MEANT TO REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF A MAJORITY OF 
THE APPELLATE COURT PANELISTS ON THE ISSUES 
RESOLVED. 
In the lead opinion, Judge Bench affirms the trial court's 
ruling that Parker, as a result of her statements to Irizarry 
before the twins were born, should be estopped from recovering from 
him any pre-filing child support. No other judge concurred in the 
lead opinion. 
In the opinion that immediately follows, Judge Wilkins begins 
by stating, "I concur in the result reached by the majority 
opinion." Addendum A, slip op. at 6. However, the published 
lrThere were 2,883 reported filings of paternity cases in Utah 
in 1993. National Center for State Courts, Examining the Work of 
State Courts, 1993 30 (1995). 
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decision later shows Judge Billings as joining only in Judge 
Wilkins' concurring opinion. If the published decision accurately 
reflects Judge Billings' vote in this case, then Judge Wilkins' 
concurring opinion is the majority opinion and reference in his 
opinion to any other "majority opinion" should be deleted. 
On the other hand, if the published decision does not 
accurately reflect Judge Billings' vote in this case, Judge Bench's 
lead opinion could be the majority opinion to which Judge Wilkins 
refers. If this is the case, correction of the mistake would 
reveal Judge Bench's conclusion, i.e., that Irizarry's reliance was 
reasonable, to be that of "the Court" for purposes of identifying 
the binding precedent set by the decision in this appeal. 
Appellant respectfully requests that this ambiguity in the 
decision issued April 13 be dispelled on rehearing. 
II. IF TWO JUDGES AGREE THAT IRIZARRY'S RELIANCE 
ON PARKER'S STATEMENTS IS UNREASONABLE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW# THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION IN DENYING, ON THE BASIS OF 
ESTOPPEL, PARKER'S CLAIM FOR PRE-FILING CHILD 
SUPPORT. 
As the Court is aware, equitable estoppel requires proof of 
three elements: (1) a statement, admission, act or failure to act 
that is inconsistent with a later-asserted claim; (2) action or 
inaction in reasonable reliance on such by the party asserting 
estoppel as a shield; and (3) injury to the party asserting 
estoppel that would result if the other party were allowed to 
repudiate the statement, admission, act, or failure to act. 
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 886 
4 
P.2d 514, 522 (Utah 1994); Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 
P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994). 
Relying heavily on the application of estoppel on similar 
facts in Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 .P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990), Judge 
Bench concludes in the lead opinion that Irizarry reasonably relied 
on three statements of Parker, during her pregnancy, that she 
wanted nothing to do with him. On the other hand, the concurring 
opinion takes the opposite view. According to Judge Wilkins, 
notwithstanding the fact-dependent nature of estoppel 
determinations, "reasonable reliance by a father in an action such 
as this should require more supporting evidence than mere 
communications or conduct by the mother occurring prior to her 
actually providing the child support." Addendum A, slip op. at 10. 
Judge Wilkins adds: 
It stretches the limits of reasonability to suggest 
that Mr. Irizarry can reasonably rely on conduct or 
communications of Ms. Parker that she will, in the 
future, relieve him of a legal obligation and will 
thereafter not assert a personal right acquired as 
a result of such future conduct. 
Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, Judge Wilkins appears to 
conclude that, as a matter of law, any reliance by Irizarry on 
Parker's statements before the children were born could not have 
been reasonable. If this is the conclusion reached by Judges 
Wilkins and Billings, a majority of the Court has determined that 
Irizarry failed to establish one of the necessary elements of 
estoppel; therefore, the trial court's refusal, based on estoppel, 
to award Parker pre-filing child support constitutes an abuse of 
discretion. See, e.g.. Ross v. Ross, 5922 P.2d 600 (Utah 1979). 
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To remedy this, the trial judge's ruling in favor of Irizarry on 
the estoppel issue should be reversed and the case remanded for 
entry of a dollar judgment against Irizarry for four years of child 
support that accrued before the paternity action was filed. 
The concurring opinion, however, inexplicably states at the 
outset that it agrees with the result of affirmance of the trial 
court. Addendum A, slip op. at 6. Thus, the ultimate result 
expressly favored by the concurring opinion irreconcilably 
conflicts with its reasoning and conclusion on the issue of the 
unreasonableness of Irizarry's reliance. 
The message sent by the multiple-opinion decision affirming 
the trial court in this case is that a biological father can use 
estoppel to avoid paying pre-filing child support, a claim for 
which section 78-45a-3 authorizes recovery, by merely showing he 
detrimentally relied on the mother's statements or conduct, whether 
or not that reliance is reasonable. Such a relaxation of estoppel 
standards to defeat an unwed father's statutory obligation to 
support his biological child is unprecedented and undesirable. It 
flatly contradicts the concurring opinion's strong view that 
application of estoppel in the child support context "should be 
severely limited and should not be invoked lightly." Addendum A, 
slip. op. at 9. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests that the Petition for Rehearing be granted 
and that the decision issued April 13 be withdrawn and reissued in 
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amended form, so that Judge Wilkins' concurring opinion--assuming 
joinder by one other panelist--becomes the majority opinion that: 
concludes Irizarry's reliance on Parker's statements is 
unreasonable as a matter of law; reverses the trial court's ruling 
on Irizarry's estoppel claim; and remands for entry of judgment 
against Irizarry for support of his twin daughters accruing from 
May 1985 to May 1989. 
Respectfully submitted this day of April, 1995. 
BILLY L. WALKER (#3358) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I caused to be mailed, by first-dass 
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Petition for Rehearing 
to the following counsel for Appellee this ^^ day of April, 1995: 
Elisabeth R. Blattner 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
— — 0 0 O 0 0 — -
FILfcU 
APR 131995 
COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah. Department of 
Human Services, ex rel. Cathy 
A. Parker, 
Plaintiffs and Appellant, 
v. 
Harry D. Irizarry, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 930583-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 3 , 1995) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David E. Roth 
The Honorable Tyrone Medley 
Attorneys: Jan Graham, Linda Luinstra, and Billy L. Walker, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant 
Barbara K. Polich and Elisabeth R. Blattner, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Billings, and Wilkins. 
BENCH, Judge: 
The Department of Social Services of the State of Utah (the 
State), on behalf of Cathy Parker, appeals the trial court's 
application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel to prevent Ms. 
Parker's recovery of reimbursement for past child support from 
Harry Irizarry. We affirm. 
FACTS 
In June 1984, Ms. Parker and Mr. Irizarry met and began 
dating. Shortly thereafter, Ms. Parker became pregnant. After 
discovering she was pregnant, Ms. Parker temporarily moved from 
Utah to California. That August, Mr. Irizarry visited Ms. Parker 
in California and learned that she was pregnant. He then 
returned to Salt Lake City. 
Mr. Irizarry testified that in September he sent a letter 
with some money to Ms. Parker, which she kept. He said that he 
followed up the letter with a telephone call. The trial court 
found that during this telephone call Ms. Parker stated that she 
did not want any money and would take care of herself. Mr. 
Irizarry testified that in November he sent another letter with 
approximately twenty dollars, and followed that letter with 
another telephone call. The trial court found that Ms. Parker 
again said she wanted nothing to do with him. Mr. Irizarry 
called again in January 1985. The trial court found that during 
this call she once again said she wanted nothing to do with him. 
In April 1985, Ms. Parker gave birth to twin girls. Ms. Parker 
left Mr. Irizarry's name off the twins' birth certificates. 
In October 1985, Mr. Irizarry married his present wife and 
moved to Puerto Rico until September 1987, when they returned to 
Salt Lake City. He and his wife now have four children. Ms. 
Parker became aware of Mr. Irizarry's return to Salt Lake City in 
November 1988. 
On May 30, 1989, the State filed a paternity action on Ms. 
Parker's behalf to establish that Mr. Irizarry is the father of 
the twins and to fix a support obligation from the time of their 
birth. Mr. Irizarry acknowledged his paternity by stipulation 
shortly after the complaint was filed and a temporary support 
order was set. After a trial in February 1993, the trial court 
entered a judgment holding Mr. Irizarry responsible for ongoing 
child support and for back child support from the time this 
action was filed. However, the trial court found that Ms. Parker 
was equitably estopped from collecting past due child support 
from the date of the twins' birth until the paternity action was 
filed. This determination was based on the statements Ms. Parker 
made to Mr. Irizarry before the twins' birth to the effect that 
she did not want any money or involvement from Mr. Irizarry. The 
State now appeals the trial court's application of equitable 
estoppel. 
ANALYSIS 
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by 
applying equitable estoppel to bar Ms. Parker's claim for 
reimbursement of back child support she has furnished.1 
1. The issue of whether a mother can relieve a father from 
current or future support obligations is not before us; nor is 
the issue presented of whether a mother's statements or acts can 
prejudice the children's or the State's rights to seek past 
(continued...) 
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w(E]quitable estoppel is *a highly fact-dependent question, one 
that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we 
cannot hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a 
course of such decisions.'" Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson. 
886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 
932, 938 (Utah 1994)); accord Terrv v. Price Mun. Corp. 784 P.2d 
146, 148 (Utah 1989). We will not overturn the trial court's 
application of equitable estoppel absent an abuse of discretion. 
Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65. 
In Baaos v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974), the Utah 
Supreme Court discussed the distinction between reimbursement for 
past due support and future support: 
it is appropriate to point out that support 
money can fall into two separate categories: 
First, the current and ongoing right of a 
child to receive support money from his 
father (parent); and second, the right to 
receive reimbursement for support of a child 
after that has been done. As to the second, 
suppose a father (parent) fails over a period 
of time to furnish support of the child, and 
the mother, or someone else, furnishes it. 
That person then has the right to claim 
reimbursement from the parent, the same as 
any other past debt. The right of 
reimbursement belongs to whoever furnished 
the support; and it is subject to 
negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or 
discharge in the same manner as any other 
debt. 
I£. at 143. While the court in Baaas ultimately refused to apply 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel because the claims asserted 
were for current and future support, it held that the right to 
reimbursement for past support already furnished was a debt 
subject to legal and equitable doctrines. Is£.; see also Borland 
v. Chandler, 733 P.2d 144, 146 (Utah 1987) (holding that 
equitable doctrines, such as estoppel, apply in statutory 
paternity actions); Wasescha v. Wasescha. 548 P.2d 895, 896 (Utah 
1976) (holding that one who provided back child support may be 
estopped from seeking reimbursement for money expended). 
1. (...continued) 
support from a father. The only issue in this case concerns Ms. 
Parker's claim for reimbursement of child support she has already 
provided. 
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In Burrow v, Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah App. 1990), on 
facts similar to the present case, this court applied equitable 
estoppel consistent with Borland. Wasescha. and Baaas to a claim 
for reimbursement for past support• In Burrow, the mother gave 
birth out of wedlock. Following the birth of the child, the 
mother told a friend that she wanted nothing to do with the 
father. The friend relayed this information to the father. 
Relying on this information, the father married and incurred 
additional financial obligations. 
Seven years after the child's birth, the mother brought a 
paternity action seeking reimbursement for back child support. 
The father argued that the mother should be barred from receiving 
back child support by the doctrines of laches and/or equitable 
estoppel. The trial court concluded, based on Zito v. Chandler. 
584 P.2d 868 (Utah 1978) (per curiam), that equitable doctrines 
were not available in statutory paternity actions and awarded the 
mother four years back child support consistent with Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-45a-3. The father appealed* 
During the course of the appeal, the supreme court overruled 
Zito and, as earlier expressed in Wasescha and Bacras. held that 
equitable defenses such as laches and equitable estoppel are 
available in paternity actions. See Borland. 733 P.2d at 146. 
Relying on Borland, this court reversed and remanded for a 
determination of whether laches and/or equitable estoppel barred 
the mother's action. Burrow. 788 P.2d at 1047. 
On remand, the trial court applied equitable estoppel and 
found that: (1) the mother had unreasonably delayed the filing 
of her claim for past child support; (2) the mother's delay 
amounted to more than mere silence because of her representations 
that she wanted nothing to do with the father; and (3) the father 
reasonably relied upon the mother's representations. Based on 
its findings, the trial court concluded that the mother's claim 
for past child support was barred by the doctrine of equitable 
estoppel. J&. at 1048. The mother appealed. 
In the second appeal, this court restated the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel: 
"Estoppel is an equitable doctrine which 
precludes parties from asserting their rights 
where their actions render it inequitable to 
allow them to assert those rights. Estoppel 
requires proof of three elements: (1) a 
statement, admission, act, or failure to act 
by one party inconsistent with a later-
asserted claim; (2) the other party's 
reasonable action or inaction based upon the 
930583-CA 4 
first party's statement, admission, actf or 
failure to act; and (3) injury to the second 
party that would result from allowing the 
first party to contradict or repudiate its 
statement, admission, act, or failure to 
act.11 
Id., at 1048 (quoting Brixen & Christopher. Architects v. Elton. 
777 P.2d 1039, 1043-44 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted)). 
This court upheld the trial court's application of equitable 
estoppel and ruled that the mother's claim for reimbursement of 
back child support was barred: 
First, it is uncontroverted that 
appellant failed to make any request or to 
take any action to require respondent to pay 
back child support for seven years. This was 
an unreasonable delay. Further, with 
adequate evidentiary support, the trial court 
found that appellant made statements to a 
mutual friend inconsistent with requiring 
respondent to pay child support/ which she 
knew or should have known would be 
communicated to respondent and, in fact, 
were. This behavior is inconsistent with her 
present claim that respondent owes her $7,200 
for past child support. 
Second, respondent failed to pay support 
for those seven years because he reasonably 
relied upon both appellant's failure to take 
any overt action to require him to pay, and 
upon her communication to the mutual friend 
that she did not want anything to do with him 
and that she would handle the rearing of the 
child herself. Thus, respondent's failure to 
pay child support was based upon more than 
mere silence. • . • 
Third, as a result of this reliance, 
respondent assumed other obligations, both in 
his personal life and in his business, that 
would have been tempered had he been aware of 
the need and obligation to support the child. 
Id. 
The trial court in the present case made findings with 
respect to each element of equitable estoppel. First, the trial 
court found that Ms. Parker "made statements [and] took actions 
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that led [Mr. Irizarry] to reasonably conclude that she wanted 
nothing to do with him and didn't want his support." Second, the 
trial court found that it was reasonable for Mr. Irizarry to rely 
on Ms. Parker's statements and actions. Third, the trial court 
found that, in reliance on Ms. Parker's statements and actions, 
Mr. Irizarry married and incurred additional expenses. The trial 
court's findings are supported by the evidence. Based upon these 
findings, the trial court concluded that Ms. Parker was estopped 
from receiving reimbursement for child support furnished prior to 
the filing of this action. 
Ms. Parker made at least three statements that she wanted 
nothing to do with Mr. Irizarry and that she would take care of 
herself. Unlike the father in Burrow. Mr. Irizarry was the one 
who initiated the contacts between the parties in order to 
determine whether Ms. Parker needed his assistance. Ms. Parker's 
statements, in contrast to those of the mother in Burrow, were 
made directly to the father so that there was no question that he 
was aware of and understood Ms. Parker's position. The substance 
of Ms. Parker's statements, however, bear a striking resemblance 
to the mother's statements in Burrow. If anything, Ms. Parker's 
statements were clearer and more concise than the statements made 
in Burrow. Ms. Parker's decision to leave Mr. Irizarry off of 
the birth certificates also supports the trial court's decision. 
Like the father in Burrow, Mr. Irizarry reasonably relied on Ms. 
Parker's statements and married and incurred additional financial 
obligations. Under Burrow. the trial court in the present case 
was clearly acting within its discretion by ruling that Ms. 
Parker was estopped from receiving reimbursement for back child 
support. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court properly denied Ms. Parker's request for 
reimbursement of past child support under the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel. The trial court's ruling is affirmed. 
. Bench, Judge 
WILKINS, Judge (concurring in the result): 
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. 
However, I believe it.is the policy of the law in this instance 
KU*Ul 
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to hold both parents fully accountable for the support of their 
children. 
Estoppel is "an equitable doctrine which precludes parties 
from asserting their Town] rights where their Town! actions 
render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights." 
Brixen & Christopher. Architects v. Elton, 777 P.2d 1039, 1043 
(Utah App. 1989) (emphasis added). Application of this doctrine 
in a child support context should be significantly limited. 
It has long been recognized that the child's right to 
receive current or future support is his or her own and "is not 
subject to being bartered away, or estopped, or in any way 
defeated by the conduct of the parents or others." Baaas v. 
Anderson. 528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974); see also Larsen v. 
Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 227, 300 P.2d 596, 598 (1956); Price v. 
Price. 4 Utah 2d 153, 154, 289 P.2d 1044, 1044 (1955) ("Future 
child support effectively cannot be the subject of bargain and 
sale. Among ether things, the State is an interested party in 
such matters since a child's welfare is at stake."). 
In the case of a child support obligation arising in a 
paternity context, the interested parties are the child, parents, 
and the State. The child has a right to support from his or her 
parents. Utah Code Ann. SS 78-45-3 (1992) (duty of father to 
support his child), 78-45-4 (1992) (duty of mother to support her 
child), 78-45a-l (1992) (duty of father of child born outside 
marriage same as father of child born within marriage). 
In a paternity action, the claim for past child support is 
already limited to four years by statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45a-3 (1992) ("The father's liability for past education and 
necessary support are limited to a period of four years next 
preceding the commencement of a [paternity] action."). In fact, 
the State argues that this statute provides adequate financial 
protection for the biological father, and thus should be read to 
preempt the availability of equitable estoppel as an additional 
protection. 
Unfortunately, current case law prevents us from accepting 
the State's argument. In Zito v. Butler, 584 P.2d 868 (Utah 
1978) (per curiam), the mother of a child brought a paternity 
action against the father over four years after the child's 
birth. The mother was awarded past child support, limited only 
by section 78-45a-3, which, as noted above, limits the father's 
liability to a period of four years next preceding the 
commencement of an action. The father sought to invoke the 
equitable doctrines of estoppel and laches in addition to the 
limitation already imposed by section 78-45a-3. The per curiam 
decision of the supreme court held summarily that these equitable 
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doctrines do not apply in a statutory action. Zito. 584 P.2d at 
869. 
However, this reasoning was expressly overruled in Borland 
v. Chandler. 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987). In Borland, the father 
attempted to raise a defense of laches to a paternity action 
brought seven years after the birth of the child. The court held 
that while laches did not apply to the facts of that case, it was 
nevertheless available as a defense in a paternity action. The 
court stated: 
At common law, an equitable defense could not 
be raised to a legal action, and because a 
statutory action was legal in nature, 
equitable defenses would not apply. This 
seems to be the theory behind Zito. a per 
curiam opinion. However, Utah long ago 
abolished any formal distinction between law 
and equity. It is well established that 
equitable defenses may be applied in actions 
at law and that principles of equity apply 
wherever necessary to prevent injustice. 
Therefore, it is clear that under appropriate 
circumstances, laches may bar an action for 
paternity. . . . Therefore, we conclude that 
to the extent that Zito stands for the 
proposition that an equitable defense is not 
available, it is an incorrect statement of 
the law and is overruled. 
X£. at 146 (citations omitted)• 
The supreme court in Borland was not faced with the specific 
question of whether equitable estoppel can defeat a mother's 
claim for reimbursement of past child support, given the four-
year limitation already imposed by section 78-45a-3. The court 
did not specifically address whether the four-year limitation was 
intended to preclude the application of equitable estoppel as to 
those four years. However, since the four-year limitation on 
past child support was part of the Zito case, and the supreme 
court overruled Zito in broad terms without reserving the 
question of the specific preemptive power of this legislative 
limitation, we must infer from Borland that the court views the 
defense of equitable estoppel as available in an action to 
recover past child support accruing within the four-year period 
prior to the filing of the paternity action. This court so 
relied on Borland in Burrow v. Vrontikis. 788 P.2d 1046 (Utah 
App. 1990), when it sanctioned the use of equitable estoppel as a 
defense to a mother's claim for back child support in a paternity 
action. 
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Based on gjto, Borland, and Burrow, we are now forced to 
conclude that the defense of equitable estoppel to a claim for 
reimbursement of past child support has not been preempted by the 
four year limitation of section 78-45a-3. There is no clear 
indication that section 78-45a-3 is intended to be the only 
possible limitation to any obligation arising from a child 
support obligation. 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is intended to prevent 
the sometimes harsh rule of law from working an unfairness 
between two parties. In a child support context, and as the law 
now stands, equitable estoppel is applicable between the parents 
after the child's rights are discharged. The courts are at 
liberty to use equitable estoppel as a tool to strike what is 
believed to be a fair balance between the mother and the father. 
However, the balance struck between the mother and father has a 
residual effect on the interests of the child and the State. 
Those interests suggest that the balance should be tilted in 
favor of the parent who actually furnishes support to the child. 
So, while equitable estoppel presently has an application in this 
area, its application should be severely limited and should not 
be invoked lightly. 
In this case, the trial court found that Ms. Parker made 
statements prior to the birth of the children to the effect that 
she did not want Mr. Irizarry's money, or to have anything to do 
with him, but that at the same time she kept money proffered by 
him.2 At the time she made those statements, Ms. Parker had not 
expended funds in support of the twins. However, the current 
case law reveals that reviewing courts have failed to require 
strict application of the facts to the correct legal standard of 
equitable estoppel. Utah courts require reasonable reliance, in 
the form of action or inaction, as one of the elements of 
equitable estoppel. See, e.g. . Trolley Scruare Assoc, v. Nielson. 
886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994); Burrow. 788 P.2d at 1048. 
Recognizing that such a determination is "a highly fact-dependent 
question,w Trolley Square, 886 P.2d at 65, to nevertheless find 
2. The trial court found that Ms. Parker made three statements 
to Mr. Irizarry: (1) In September 1984, Ms. Parker told Mr. 
Irizarry over the telephone that "she didn't want any money and 
would take care of herself.11 (2) After he sent a letter, Mr. 
Irizarry made a follow-up call to Ms. Parker in November 1984 and 
91
 once again she said she wanted nothing to do with [Mr. 
Irizarry].w (3) In January 1985, Mr. Irizarry called Ms. Parker 
and "once again the plaintiff said she wanted nothing to do with 
him.M In April 1985, the twins were born. The findings are 
supported by the evidence and, thus, are not clearly erroneous. 
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reasonable reliance by a father in an action such as this should 
require more supporting evidence than mere communications or 
conduct by the mother occurring prior to her actually providing 
the child support. 
In the present case, Mr. Irizarry seeks to estop Ms. Parker 
from asserting her right to reimbursement. At the time of the 
conduct and communications relied on by Mr. Irizarry, Ms. Parker 
had no right to reimbursement simply because she had not yet 
furnished the support. Indeed, w[t]he right of reimbursement 
belongs to whoever furnish^ the support." Baaas. 528 P.2d at 
143 (emphasis added). It stretches the limits of reasonability 
to suggest that Mr. Irizarry can reasonably rely on conduct or 
communications of Ms. Parker that she will, in the future, 
relieve him of a legal obligation and will thereafter not assert 
a personal right acquired as a result of such future conduct. It 
would seem only logical that to act reasonably in not reimbursing 
Ms. Parker for the support she provided, Mr. Irizarry would have 
to have some knowledge that Ms. Parker actually provided that 
support. 
Furthermore, although the application of equitable estoppel 
to the statements and actions of Ms. Parker prior to the birth of 
the twins is in keeping with the present state of the law, it 
leaves in jeopardy the interests of not only the children, but 
also those of the State. Perhaps the question of when equitable 
estoppel should apply in a paternity action for past child 
support will be addressed by the legislature in order to give 
full effect to the underlying duty of a father to support his 
children. It is clear that the legislature intends that this 
responsibility be taken seriously, lest the children suffer or 
become a public charge. See Utah Code Ann. SS 62A-11-101, -104 
(1992). 
I CONCUR IN THE CONCURRING OPINION OP JUDGE WILKINS: 
TJudith M. Billings, Judge 
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